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1 Introduction
Abstention is a consistent feature in elections. For example, the July 2019 election of the House
of Councillors in Japan achieved a voter turnout of 48.48%, which is the second lowest turnout in
national elections since 1947.1 One obvious reason for abstention is that voters incur costs from
voting, thus abstaining if the marginal cost of voting is greater than the marginal benefit. This is
more likely to happen in larger elections because one voter’s contribution to the outcome of the
election is reduced. Although the costs to voting can explain abstention, it is difficult to explain
why some people vote even in large elections.
To solve this paradox, following the literature on voting participation, we provide a new rationale
for voter abstention by focusing on a prominent behavioral aspect: loss aversion. Loss aversion
means voters are more sensitive to losses from election outcomes than to proportional gains.
We analyze a two-candidate election model in which voters have expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences (EBRDPs) as in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
In our model, in which voting is costless, each individual is certain of their preferred candidate
but uncertain about which candidate is more popular, although they receive partial information
about the popularity of candidates.2 After receiving this information, each individual decides
whether to vote. It is easily demonstrable that all individuals prefer to vote rather than to abstain
if they do not incur any cost for voting.3 However, even without incurring costs, abstention could
still occur if voters are loss averse in respect to a psychological loss incurred by comparing their
realized outcome with their expected possible outcomes. Under loss aversion, abstention can serve
as a device to alleviate voters’ expected losses from uncertainty over the results of the election. In
large elections, the marginal benefit of voting is low but still effective when voters do not incur any
costs. However, loss aversion introduces another effect that may overweigh this marginal benefit
1This result was announced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The National Diet of Japan is
composed of two houses: House of Representatives and House of Councillors.
2This structure follows Goeree and Großer (2007), Krasa and Polborn (2009), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010),
although these authors assume a cost in voting.
3This is because rational individuals vote only when the marginal benefit of voting exceeds the marginal cost of
voting. This holds even if we consider the above uncertainty related to the competitiveness of an election.
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from voting. Loss-averse voters dislike uncertainty over the outcome of an election and feel the loss
from unexpectedly losing. This feeling of loss is more severe when the election is more competitive
because the uncertainty of the outcome is higher. To avoid this feeling, voters abstain.
This result contrasts sharply with that under a costly voting model, in which abstentions are
rarer in competitive elections. For example, a positive relationship between competitiveness and
abstention rates was observed in an official election in Mexico in 1988. Although this election
was more competitive than the 1982 presidential election, the abstention rate was also higher.4
Our comparative statics also show that the abstention tendency is higher for the individuals who
prefer the losing candidate. This is because the effect of loss aversion is more severe for the voters
supporting the minority candidate than those supporting the majority candidate.
Abstention has been primarily studied through costly voting models, such as by Ledyard (1981,
1984).5 In the literature on costless voting with abstention, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) focus
on an asymmetric of information among voters and propose the theory of the swing voter’s curse.
When voters face uncertainty about which is their preferred candidate, less-informed voters abstain
to prevent their poor decisions from affecting the election outcome, even when voting is costless.6 In
contrast to these approaches, our model considers the behavioral aspect of voting by incorporating
voters’ EBRDPs. Additionally, rather than factoring in the swing voter’s curse, in which voters are
uncertain about their preferences, the voters in our model know their preferences but are uncertain
about the aggregate preference distribution.
The notion of reference dependence was originally investigated by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and models of EBRDPs are developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Although many
studies have applied Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) approach, to the best of our knowledge, few
researchers have studied the influence of voters’ loss aversion in competitive elections based on
4 See Larmer (1988) for more details.
5 Although much of the literature uses pivotal voter models, several studies employ an ethical voter model, in which
some citizens vote to make their group optimal (Harsanyi (1980), Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), and Ali and Lin
(2013)). In addition, Feddersen (2004) surveys the theories of why people vote or abstain in economic models.
6 As subsequent extension models of the swing voter’s curse, see, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999),
McMurray (2013), and Herrera et al. (2019).
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EBRDPs.7 One of the most noticeable exceptions is Grillo’s (2016) model, in which two candidates
state their preferences, which remain private information, and voters prefer politically attractive
candidates. Grillo (2016) shows that voters’ loss aversion makes truthful communication possible
at equilibrium.8 In contrast to Grillo (2016), we find the condition for an equilibrium where
abstention occurs due to voters’ loss aversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. In section 3,
we analyze our equilibrium. Section 4 extends the analysis provided in section 3 to the case of
asymmetric voters, and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model includes two candidates, A and B. The electorate has 2n + 1 individuals and is divided
into two types, where each type has an identical preference and the preferences of each type are
diametrically opposed. One type (type A) prefers A to B and the other type (type B) prefers B
to A. An individual’s type is private information held by that individual. A given individual is
type A with probability ω. There are two states with respect to ω: ω ∈ {ωa,ωb} and the prior
of ω = ωa is 12 . Before voting, each individual receives a signal θ on the true state. This signal
depends on the true state and is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed random
variable with cumulative distribution Fi and density fi for each i ∈ {a, b}, where fi > 0 for all θ.
Pr(ω = ωa | θ) denotes the probability of ω = ωa when the individual receives signal θ. Then,
Pr(ω = ωa | θ) = 1 − Pr(ω = ωb | θ) = fa(θ)fa(θ)+ fb(θ) = θ. Each individual chooses e ∈ {0,1},
where e = 1 indicates that the individual votes for their preferred candidate and e = 0 indicates they
abstain. Elections are decided by a simple plurality with some tie-breaking rule, such as a coin toss.
7 The EBREPs model developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) has been applied to the models of Heidhues and
Kőszegi (2008, 2014), Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), Karle and Peitz (2014), Rosato (2016), Karle and Schumacher
(2017), and research conducted by Heidhues and Kőszegi (2018) on industrial organization, as well as by Herweg,
Muller, and Weinschenk (2010), Daido and Murooka (2016), Dato, Muller, and Grunewald (2018), and research
conducted by Kőszegi (2014) on contract theory.
8 Although their formulation of reference points differs from that of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), Alesina and
Passarelli (2019) build a political model that incorporates voters’ loss aversion and show that loss aversion leads to
significant differences from the results that do not consider voters’ loss aversion.
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The payoff of an individual, x ∈ {xw, xl}, depends on the outcome of the election: xw is the payoff
for winning and xl that for losing. We assume that xw > xl without loss of generality. Denoting pe
as the probability of winning when an individual chooses e, we represent the expected payoff of the
individual as follows:
u(e) = pexw + (1 − pe)xl . (1)
We consider loss-averse voters that exhibit EBRDPs á la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).9 A
key assumption of EBRDPs is that each individual’s overall utility comprises of intrinsic payoffs
and psychological gain-loss payoffs. In our model, the individual has one payoff dimension from
the result of an election and experiences a psychological gain or loss by comparing a realized with
a reference payoff.
We denote an individual’s reference point for their outcome as r . For a deterministic reference
point, if their actual outcome is x, then their overall utility is given by
x︸︷︷︸
intrinsic payoff
+ µ(x − r)︸   ︷︷   ︸
gain-loss payoff
,
where µ(·) is a gain-loss function that corresponds toKahneman andTversky’s (1979) value function.
We assume µ(·) is a piecewise linear function in order to focus on the effect of loss aversion. We
then define the gain-loss function when the intrinsic payoff is x and the reference point is r as
µ(x − r) =

η(x − r) if x − r ⩾ 0,
ηλ(x − r) if x − r < 0,
where η ⩾ 0 represents the weight on the gain-loss payoff and λ ⩾ 1 represents the degree of loss
aversion.10
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the reference point is determined
by rational beliefs on outcomes and that the reference point itself is stochastic if the outcome is
9 O’Donoghue and Sprenger (2018) provide a concise, but detailed introduction to EBRDPs and its related topics.
10The individual is loss neutral when λ = 1.
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stochastic. Each individual experiences a gain or loss by comparing every possible outcome with
every reference point. To describe the concept of stochastic reference points in a simple manner,
suppose that the individual expects to choose e = 1. This individual expects to win and receive xw
with probability p1 and lose and receive xl with probability 1 − p1. If they choose e = 1 and the
candidate that they vote for wins, the individual receives xw . Because this occurs with probability
p1 and they expected to receive xw with probability p1 or xl with probability 1− p1, they experience
no gain or loss with probability p1×p1 but experience a gain of xw− xl with probability p1×(1−p1).
However, if they choose e = 1 and the candidate that they vote for loses, the individual receives xl .
Because this occurs with probability 1 − p1 and they compare this result with their expectations,
they experience a loss of xw − xl with probability (1 − p1) × p1 but experience no gain-loss with
probability (1 − p1) × (1 − p1). Consequently, the individual correctly anticipates all off the above
cases. Their expected gain-loss utility, when their reference choice is e = 1 and their actual choice
is e = 1, is −p1(1 − p1)η(λ − 1)(xw − xl).
In our model, the individual’s overall expected utility when their reference choice is ê, their
actual choice is e, and the corresponding probabilities are pê and pe, respectively, can be represented
as follows:
u(e | ê) = pexw + (1 − pe)xl
+ pê[peµ(xw − xw) + (1 − pe)µ(xl − xw)] + (1 − pê)[peµ(xw − xl) + (1 − pe)µ(xl − xl)]
= pexw + (1 − pe)xl︸                ︷︷                ︸
intrinsic payoff
− pê(1 − pe)ηλ(xw − xl)︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
loss payoff
+ (1 − pê)peη(xw − xl)︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
gain payoff
. (2)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We focus on a symmetric case where ωa = 1 − ωb = ρ > 12 and Fa(θ) = 1 − Fb(1 − θ) for all θ.
Considering the behavior of a type A individual, say i, we suppose that the number of individuals
except i who vote for A is nA and that this figure is nB for B. Then, for individual i, p1 = [Pr(nA+1 >
6
nB) + 12Pr(nA + 1 = nB)] ≡ pA1 and p0 = [Pr(nA > nB) + 12Pr(nA = nB)] ≡ pA0 .11 For analytical
simplicity, we assume xw = 1 and xl = 0.
First, we briefly confirm the choice of individual i, who is loss neutral (λ = 1). The utility of
the loss-neutral individual i depends on their choice ei ∈ {0,1}, as follows:
u(ei) =

pA1 if ei = 1,
pA0 if ei = 0.
ei = 1 always dominates ei = 0 because our model does not consider a direct cost in voting.
Next, we study the decisions of loss-averse voters. We derive the optimal voting behavior based
on the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) defined by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007). Under
CPE, the individual’s reference point is acclimated to the chosen action. This is plausible when
the action is determined well in advance of realizing the outcome. And, hence, they modify their
belief to the action they chose before the outcome is realized. Because the individual knows that
their belief will change based on their chosen action before the outcome is realized, they take this
change into account when choosing their action. Hence, each individual’s action determines their
reference point under CPE. The condition for the individual to choose to vote under CPE is:
u(1 | 1) ⩾ u(0 | 0). (CPE)
We confine our analysis to pure strategies and focus on symmetric equilibria.12
For individual i who prefers A, the condition of voting under (CPE) is represented as follows:
u(1 | 1) ⩾ u(0 | 0) ⇒ (pA1 − pA0 )[1 − η(λ − 1)(1 − pA1 − pA0 )] ⩾ 0
⇒ pA1 + pA0 ⩾ 1 −
1
η(λ − 1) ≡ γ. (CPE-A)
11The corresponding probabilities for the individual whose preferred candidate is B are pB1 and p
B
0 , respectively.
12As shown by Dato, Müller, and Grunewald (2017), each individual will never prefer to randomize their own choices
under the solution concept of CPE. Hence, without loss of generality, we can focus on pure strategies.
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This shows that when γ > 0 (i.e., η(λ − 1) > 1) abstention can occur.13 Because voters are
loss averse, they have first-order risk aversion to uncertainty over winning the election, which is
qualitatively different from a standard concave utility. To confirm this, suppose that voters are loss
neutral (η = 0) but have a concave utility function, v(x). The condition to vote is (pA1 − pA0 )v(1) ⩾ 0.
This condition always holds and abstention never occurs.
We can rewrite the left-hand side of (CPE-A) when individual i receives a signal θi, as follows:
pA1 + p
A
0 =
ρθi
ρθi + (1 − ρ)(1 − θi)︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
Posterior probability that ω = ωa
[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] +
(1 − ρ)(1 − θi)
ρθi + (1 − ρ)(1 − θi)︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
Posterior probability that ω = ωb
[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)],
where we denote pKei (ω j) as the probability that the candidate K wins when a type K individual
chooses ei under state ω j .
Rearranging (CPE-A), we obtain the following condition regarding θ:
θ¯A =
(1 − ρ)(γ − [pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)])
ρ[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] − (1 − ρ)[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)] − γ(2ρ − 1)
< θi . (3)
When this condition holds, the individual chooses to vote rather than abstain. vK(ω j) denotes the
probability that an individual is type K and they vote for K in state ω j . Then, respectively,
vA(ωa) = ρ(1 − Fa(θ¯A)) and vA(ωb) = (1 − ρ)(1 − Fb(θ¯A)).
Correspondingly, the condition of a type B individual voting for B is
θ¯B =
(1 − ρ)(γ − [pB1 (ωa) + pB0 (ωa)])
ρ[pB1 (ωb) + pB0 (ωb)] − (1 − ρ)[pB1 (ωa) + pB0 (ωa)] − γ(2ρ − 1)
< 1 − θi . (4)
13Estimating λ in an EBRDPsmodel, Dreyfuss et al. (2019) find amean of λ = 1.6−3.0with substantial heterogeneity
in a matching model. For more experimental results on the estimation of λ, see the references in Dreyfuss et al. (2019).
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Then, respectively,
vB(ωb) = ρFb(1 − θ¯B) and vB(ωa) = (1 − ρ)Fa(1 − θ¯B).
Since we assume symmetry between types A and B, we focus on the equilibria in which
type A and B individuals adopt the same cutoff, so that θ¯A = θ¯B = θ¯. By assuming symmetry,
Fb(1 − θ¯B) = 1 − Fa(θ¯B) and Fa(1 − θ¯B) = 1 − Fb(θ¯B). Therefore, if θ¯A = θ¯B = θ¯, we have
vA(ωa) = vB(ωb) > vB(ωa) = vA(ωb). (5)
Then, pBei (ωa) = pAei (ωb) and pBei (ωb) = pAei (ωa) for each ei ∈ {0,1}. If θ¯A = θ¯B = θ¯, θ¯ is defined as:
θ¯ =
(1 − ρ)(γ − [pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)])
ρ[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] − (1 − ρ)[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)] − γ(2ρ − 1)
. (6)
We then prove the existence of an equilibrium and characterize θ¯ in the limit.
Proposition 1. For a sufficiently large n, a symmetric equilibrium exists. The equilibrium cutoff
point in the limit n →∞ is given by:
θ∗ ≡ (1 − ρ)γ
ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ . (7)
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium. Note that θ¯ is self-mapping
because each pKei (ω j) is a function of n and vK(ω j), where K ∈ {A,B}, j ∈ {a, b},and vK(ω j) is a
function of θ¯ = θ¯A = θ¯B. Letting Gn(θ¯) be defined as the right-hand side of (6), finding a fixed
point for Gn proves the existence of an equilibrium. We first check the continuity of Gn. By (5), we
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can show that pAei (ωa) > 1/2 > pAei (ωb) for ei = 0,1. Then, the denominator of Gn becomes
ρ[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] − (1 − ρ)[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)] − γ(2ρ − 1)
> ρ − (1 − ρ) − γ(2ρ − 1) = (1 − γ)(2ρ − 1) > 0.
Since the denominator takes a positive value for each θ¯, Gn is well defined. The continuity
immediately follows from the continuity of Fj for j ∈ {a, b}.
Note that, when n is sufficiently large and if θ¯ = 0, the probability that A wins under the
state of ωa converges to 1 and the probability that A wins under the state of ωb converges to 0
because of (5) and the law of large numbers. Hence, Gn(0) ≈ (1−ρ)γ2ρ(1−γ)+γ > 0. Conversely, if θ¯ = 1,
Gn(1) = (1−ρ)(γ−1)(1−γ)(2ρ−1) < 0 because individuals abstain. Then, by the continuity ofGn, for a sufficiently
large n, the intermediate value theorem implies the existence of the fixed point.
Now, we can characterize the fixed point ofGn when n →∞. As long as θ¯ < 1, for a sufficiently
large n, pAei (ωa) ≈ 1 and pAei (ωb) ≈ 0 for ei = 1,0 because of (5) and the law of large numbers. Then,
lim
n→∞Gn(θ¯) := limn→∞
(1 − ρ)(γ − [pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)])
ρ[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] − (1 − ρ)[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)] − γ(2ρ − 1)
=
(1 − ρ)γ
ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ .
Therefore, the fixed point also converges to θ∗. □
Since θ∗ is defined by (7), as long as γ ∈ (0,1), the fixed point is within (0,1/2). In this case,
the rate of abstention in state ωa at the limit is
ρFa(θ∗) + (1 − ρ)(1 − Fa(1 − θ∗)). (8)
In our symmetric case, the rate of abstention in the state of ωb at the limit has the same value. The
comparative statics show the properties of the limit abstention rate.
Proposition 2. Suppose that η(λ − 1) > 1. (i) The limit abstention rate is increasing in η and λ.
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Additionally, if Fa(1/2) < 1/2, (ii) the limit abstention rate is higher in the losing group than in the
winning group, and (iii) the limit abstention rate is decreasing in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first check the properties of θ∗ as follows:14
∂θ∗
∂γ
=
ρ(2 − (ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ))
[ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ]2 > 0, (9)
∂θ∗
∂ρ
= −2(1 − γ) + γ[ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ][ρ(2 − γ) + (1 − ρ)γ]2 < 0. (10)
First, using (9), we can show that R is increasing in γ. Since γ increases in η and λ, this
completes the proof of (i). Next, under the state of ωa, type A individuals are in the winning
group, while type B individuals are in the losing group. When θ∗ < 1/2 and Fa(1/2) < 1/2,
Fa(θ∗) ⩽ Fa(1/2) < 1 − Fa(1/2) ⩽ 1 − Fa(1 − θ∗). This means that the abstention rate of Group
A (Fa(θ∗)) is less than that of Group B (1 − Fa(1 − θ∗)), thus completing the proof of (ii). Finally,
because Fa(θ∗) > 1 − Fa(1 − θ∗) and (10), we verify that the differentiation of the limit abstention
rate by ρ is negative, thus completing the proof of (iii). □
In Proposition 2, assumption Fa(1/2) < 1/2 implies that more than half of voters receive signals
informing them that state ωa is likelier than ωb when the state is ωa. What causes our abstention
result is voters’ loss aversion. A voter’s feeling of loss from unexpectedly losing in the election is
greater than any proportional gain from unexpectedly winning. We can understand this effect by
scrutinizing (CPE-A).
From (CPE-A), the individual does not vote when
(pA1 − pA0 )︸     ︷︷     ︸
the standard effect
− η(λ − 1)(pA1 − pA0 )(1 − pA1 − pA0 )]︸                                     ︷︷                                     ︸
the gain-loss effect
< 0. (11)
(11) implies that although the standard effect is present and the individual always votes if they are
loss-neutral (λ = 0), the loss-averse individual may abstain when the gain-loss effect outweighs
the standard effect. To hold (11), it is necessary that 1 − pA1 − pA0 > 0. This is satisfied when
14Note that γ > 0 ⇔ η(λ − 1) > 1. Additionally, by the definition of γ, γ < 1 when λ > 1 and η > 0.
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the probability of experiencing a gain-loss from voting is higher than that from not voting, where
pA1 (1 − pA1 ) − pA0 (1 − pA0 ) > 0. If 1 − pA1 − pA0 > 0 holds, then (11) holds when η(λ − 1) > 11−pA1 −pA0 .
As a result, the abstention rate increases in both η and λ (Proposition 2 (i)).
Because individuals receive an informative signal about which candidate is the majority’s
preference, the expected probability of winning for the minority group (pmine ) is smaller than for the
majority group (pmaje ) and, thus, 1 − pmin1 − pmin0 > 1 − pmaj1 − pmaj0 . This implies that the marginal
gain-loss effect by voting for the minority group is higher than that for the majority group.15 As
a result, the members of the minority group are more likely to abstain than the members of the
majority group (Proposition 2 (ii)).
The smaller ρ means that the election is more competitive and the probability of winning is
smaller. In this case, the gain-loss effect is more significant because 1 − pK1 − pK0 > 0 for K = A,B
is more plausible (Proposition 2 (iii)). This result is counterintuitive. The situation with high ρ
implies a close election, in which a candidate wins by a narrow margin. One would believe that in
a close election, people realize the value of their vote, leading the abstention rate to drop. In fact,
even when the marginal benefit of voting is almost negligible in a large election, people still prefer
to vote instead of staying at home as long as they do not care about cost. However, when people are
loss averse, they stay at home if the gain-loss effect overweighs this standard effect of voting.
4 Asymmetric case
In this section, we study the asymmetric case, where we assume that ωa > 1/2 > ωb instead of
ωa = 1 − ωb. We also weaken the assumption Fa(θ) = 1 − Fb(1 − θ).
15Note that because the difference of the probabilities between voting and abstaining, pK1 − pK0 , is sufficiently small
for K = A,B in a large election, we focus on the effect caused by 1 − pK1 − pK0 .
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Letting p ∈ (0,1) denote that probability of ω = ωa, then
pA1 + p
A
0 =
pωaθi
pωaθi + (1 − p)ωb(1 − θi) [p
A
1 (ωa) + pA1 (ωa)]
+
(1 − p)ωb(1 − θi)
pωaθi + (1 − p)ωb(1 − θi) [p
A
1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)].
A type A individual votes for A if and only if θi > θA, where
θA =
(1 − p)ωβ(γ − [pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)])
pωa[pA1 (ωa) + pA0 (ωa)] − (1 − p)ωb[pA1 (ωb) + pA0 (ωb)] − γ(p(ωa + ωb) − ωb)
. (12)
In the same way, a type B individual votes for B if and only if θi < 1 − θB, where
θB =
(p(1−ωa)(γ−[pB1 (ωa)+pB0 (ωa)])
(1−p)(1−ωb)[pB1 (ωb)+pB0 (ωb)]−p(1−ωa)[pB1 (ωa)+pB0 (ωa)]−γ(p(ωa+ωb−2)+1−ωb)
. (13)
Note that if 2 ⩾ pA1 (ωa)+pA0 (ωa)−(pA1 (ωb)+pA0 (ωb)) ⩾ 1 > γ and 2 ⩾ pB1 (ωb)+pB0 (ωb)−(pB1 (ωa)+
pB0 (ωa)) ⩾ 1 > γ, both of the denominators of the right-hand sides of (12) and (13) are positive.
Letting θ¯A = max{min{1, θA},0} and θ¯B = max{min{1, θB},0}, then the probability that a given
type A individual votes for A is
Pr(v = A | ωa) = ωa(1 − Fa(θ¯A)), Pr(v = A | ωb) = ωb(1 − Fb(θ¯A)).
Similarly, the probability that a given type B individual votes for B is
Pr(v = B | ωb) = (1 − ωb)Fb(1 − θ¯B), Pr(v = B | ωa) = (1 − ωa)Fa(1 − θ¯B).
For each given (pKe (ω j))e,j,K , θ¯A and θ¯B are computed.16 Using these, the probability that a
given individual votes for their preferred candidate is derived. Subsequently, each (pKe (ω j))e,j,K is
also derived. Thus, the relationship between the original (pKe (ω j))e,j,K and the derived (pKe (ω j))e,j,K
is written as the function Γn : [0,1]8 → [0,1]8. In an equilibrium, each (pKe (ω j))e,j,K is a fixed point
16 Here, (pKe (ωj))e, j ,K represents pKe (ωj) for e = 0,1, j = a, b, and K = A,B.
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of Γn.
We also add a restriction on [0,1]8, as follows:
2 − γ ⩾ pA1 (ωa)+pA0 (ωa)+(pA1 (ωb)+pA0 (ωb))2 ⩾ γ,
2 − γ ⩾ pB1 (ωb)+pB0 (ωb)+(pB1 (ωa)+pB0 (ωa))2 ⩾ γ.
(14)
That is, we consider the following set of equations.
Π = {(pKe (ω j))(e,j,K)∈{1,0}×{a,b}×{A,B} | (14) is satisfied}
This set is compact and convex, and if (pKe (ω j))e,j,K ∈ Π, both θA and θB are less than or equal
to 1/2. Then, in the state ωa, the probability that a given individual votes for A is greater than or
equal to ωα(1− Fα(1/2)). Conversely, the probability that a given individual votes for B is less than
or equal to 1 − ωα. Then, we can verify that if the following inequality holds, at the state ωa, the
probability of voting for A is greater than that for B.
ωa(1 − Fa(1/2)) > 1 − ωa ⇐⇒ ωa > 12 − Fa(1/2) .
Similarly, if
(1 − ωb)Fb(1/2) > ωb ⇐⇒ ωb < Fb(1/2)1 + Fb(1/2),
the probability of voting for B is greater than that for A at the state ωb.
Under these conditions, for each point in Π, as for the output of Γn, and for sufficiently large
n, pAe (ωa) and pBe (ωb) are close to 1, while pAe (ωa) and pBe (ωb) are close to 0. Then, for any point
Π, the denominators of the definitions of θA and θB are positive and Γn(Π) ⊂ Π. Because Γn is
continuous and Π is compact and convex, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem implies that Γn has a fixed
point.
If the fixed point of Γn satisfies (14) and is an interior point of Π, the fixed point (pKe (ω j))e,j,K
14
is the tuple of equilibrium probabilities of winning. As n → ∞, the equilibrium probabilities of
winning pAe (ωa) and pBe (ωb) converge to 1, and pAe (ωa) and pBe (ωb) converge to 0. Then, the cutoff
levels are the following.
θA =
(1 − p)ωbγ
pωa(2 − γ) + (1 − p)ωbγ
θB =
p(1 − ωa)γ
(1 − p)(1 − ωb)(2 − γ) + p(1 − ωa)γ
(15)
If γ > 0, both are within (0,1/2) and the derived (pKe (ω j))e,j,K satisfies (14). In sum, we have the
following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the following inequalities hold:
ωa >
1
2 − Fa(1/2), ωb <
Fb(1/2)
1 + Fb(1/2) .
Then, for a sufficiently large n, an equilibrium in which some voters abstain exists. As n → ∞, the
abstention rate converges to the following values.
ωaFa(θA) + (1 − ωa)(1 − Fa(1 − θB)) if ω = ωa,
ωbFb(θA) + (1 − ωb)(1 − Fb(1 − θB)) if ω = ωb,
where θA and θB are defined in (15).
Notice that the abstention rate of type A individuals is Fk(θA) and for type B individuals is
1 − Fk(1 − θB) when ω = ωk . Comparative statics show that Fk(θA) is decreasing in p while
1 − Fk(1 − θB) is increasing in p, where p is the probability that A is the more popular candidate.
This result implies that individuals who support the candidate who is more likely to lose also are
more likely to abstain. We can therefore confirm that the result of the symmetric case is still valid
in the asymmetric case.
15
5 Conclusions
This study develops a votingmodel that shows the existence of abstention behavior when individuals
have EBRDPs. At equilibrium, abstention is more likely to occur in a close election. Individuals
who support minority candidates are also more likely to abstain.
One concern of our assumption is that individuals cannot vote for a candidate they do not support.
The motivation for abstention is that individuals who severely dislike the unexpected losses reduce
their uncertainty by lowering the probability of winning. However, the reduction in the probability
of winning is larger when individuals vote for the opposing candidate. One explanation is that
individuals may have a behavioral cost of voting for the opponent, but this appears to rather be ad
hoc. Further analysis of this issue is left for future research.
Other potential directions for future research include extending our model by introducing pref-
erence uncertainty á la Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) and determining whether loss-aversion
deteriorates swing voters’ curse and information aggregation.
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